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Abstract
The most widely used digital signature in the real word application such as e cash
e-voting etc. is blind signature. Previously the proposed blind signature follow the foot
steps of public key cryptography(PKC) but conventional public key cryptography uses an
affirmation of a relationship between public key and identity for the holder of the corre-
sponding private key to the user, so certificate management is very difficult. To overcome
this problem Identity based cryptography is introduced. But Identity based cryptography
is inherited with key escrow problem. Blind signature with certificateless PKC(CLBS)
used widely because it eliminate the problem related to certificate management of cryp-
tography and the key escrow problem of ID based PKC. Because of large requirement of
CLBS scheme in different applications many CLBS scheme is proposed, but they were
based on bilinear pairing. However, the CLBS scheme based on bilinear pairing is not
very satisfiable because bilinear pairing operations are very complicated.
In our proposed scheme, we designed a certificateless blind signature scheme based on the
discrete logarithmic problem. The proposed scheme fulfills all the security requirements
of blind signature as well as certificateless signature. We analyzed security properties
such as blindness, unforgeability and unlinkability. The proposed scheme has less com-
putational cost. The hardness of discrete logarithmic problem (DLP) is used to prove the
security of the proposed scheme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A significant trouble in creating secure frameworks taking into account public key cryp-
tography is management of frameworks to backing the cryptographic keys authenticity.
An affirmation is needed for the relationship between public key and their corresponding
private key.
In conventional public key cryptography(PKC) there an assertion is needed about the
binding between public key of user and private key of user, because public key is open for
all so attacker use that key to send the message to receiver. in a conventional PKC, there
is a certificate authority(CA), who keep relationship between public and private keys[1].
The main problems of conventional PKC are management of certificate and revocation
also in key storage, key distribution and the certificate verification computational cost
is also very high. These are especially intense in processor or transmission capacity re-
stricted situations.
For resolving the problems of conventional PKC a new mechanism is proposed by, Shamir
(in 1984) called the Identity Based Public key Cryptography (IDB-PKC) [21].In IDB-
PKC user identification like user ID or user system IP address is declared as public key of
user.
In ID based-PKC a trusted third party called TTP is used that receive the public key of
user(user IP address or email id) and on the basis of this public key user private key is
generated, hence no certification authority is required. From one point of view the imme-
diate determination of public keys in IDB-PKC kills the prerequisite for certificates and
a rate of the issues connected with them. Then again the reliance on a TTP, who utilizes
a framework to create private keys, inexorably acquaints key escrow with ID based-PKC
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Figure 1.1: ID-Based Public Key Cryptography[20]
frameworks. ID-PKC inherently has the key escrow problem(KEP). key escrow prob-
lem is the problem where TTP has ability to decrypt any cipher-text in an ID based-PKC
scheme. Therefore, ID based-PKC can’t offer genuine non- denial in the same way as
that of in standard conventional-PKC. The key escrow problem can be settled to a some
percentage, by the use of different PKGs and the utilization of limit methods , yet it
fundamentally includes additional correspondence and framework. Consequently, this
cryptosystem may very well be suitable for minimal private frameworks with restricted
security prerequisites.
To handle the problem related to management of certificate in the TR-PKC and the prob-
lem related to IDB-PKC like key escrow problem, Al-Riyami and Paterson (2003) pro-
posed the idea of the certificateless public key cryptography(CLSPKC)[3]. In CLS-PKC
there is a PKG(Private key generator) in place of trusted third party. Like TTP in ID-PKC
here private key generator(PKG). In PKG using master key and user ID PKG generate
partial private key(PPK), and using PPK and secret key of user’s private key is gener-
ated. Hence PKG doesn’t have information about user’s private key. In CLS-PKC there
is no direct relationship between public key of user and private key of user. The capacity
and correspondence data transmission of CLS-PKC is less because of the identifier only
contains applicable data certificate-related information are not required.
1.1 Introduction of Certificateless Cryptography:
In CL-PKC in the place of TTP there is PKC private key generator having own secret key
called master key. PKC doesn’t has the information about user key. He know only user
2
1.1 Introduction of Certificateless Cryptography: Introduction
Figure 1.2: Certificateless Public Key Cryptography[20]
identity and on the basis of that identity and system parameter with master key PPK is
generated. user select a secret key, using this and secret key and partial private key the
user private key is generated.
A CLBS is defined in the following 7 phases.
1. Set up phase: PKG runs the key setup algorithm. For this algorithm security
parameters are available. The algorithm takes security parameters as input and
output a master key and a parameter list param. param is declared public and keep
master private key private.
2. Partial private key generation phase:PKG taken public parameters using
user ID and master private key calculates partial private key.
3. User Secret key generation phase:User Key generation: Secret key genera-
tion phase: User secret key use for generating full private key of user. User chooses
his private key chosen from the set that are available in param.
4. User private key generation phase: User Generates full private key us using
PPK and user secret key.
5. User public key generation phase: User public key is generating at this
step using secret key of user and master public key. So here no direct relationship
between public key of user and private key of user. User can generate any key first
either public or private.
6. Encrypt: In this phase, the message m is encrypted available parameters for this
phase are a message msg, system parameters params, the public key of user and
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identity of user. It gives cipher-text of mesage m as output. It may output null
symbol if the encryption failure.
7. Decrypt: In this phase using private key and input parameters with cipher-text, it
returns a message msg if the decryption occur sucessfully otherwise return a null
value if the decryption failure.
1.2 Digital Signature
Digital signature is an electronic signature used in the authenticity, validity, and integrity
of a message[14]. Digital signature is not included with the document like conventional
signature, it is send as a separate document. A digital signature is asymmetric key system
in which the document signs by signer with his/her private key and verifier verifies it using
public key of signer. A secure digital signature scheme provide message authentication,
message integrity and non repudiation.
1.3 Blind Signature
Blind signature is a type of digital signature. In BS a signer signs the message without
knowing the content of the message. Initially this scheme is proposed by David Chaum
(1983)[7]. The blind signature scheme generally utilized into electronic voting and elec-
tronic money because of the properties of its for example, anonymity, blindness, and
unforgeability[8].
In Blind signature scheme bob will get a valid signature from the signer Alice without
disclosing the contents of the message as well as the signature to her. Alice will be able
to verify the signature after getting message m and signature but cannot link the message
and signature pair to the to the definite occurrence of the signing phase.
It permits to acknowledge secure electronic payment frameworks ensuring client’s pro-
tection and other cryptographic conventions securing the members’ obscurity (e.g. secure
voting conventions). At first this idea appears a bit peculiar why would you need to sign
something without seeing it. Things being what they are, when connected appropriately,
this thought has some extremely decent applications in circumstances where obscurity is
a major issue.
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Two such applications are digital cash and internet voting. When you present an online
vote, you may like for that vote to be mysterious so nobody can tell whom you voted in
favor of. So also with electronic money, you may not need another person to know who
you are the point at which you spend it. This is like typical paper money - when you make
a purchase,the seller pretty much has no clue who you are, however he can most likely
tell whether the cash you issued him is legitimate.Specically, in this electronic money
situation, a record relates to an electronic coin or note, and the underwriter speaks to a
bank.The high-roller holds obscurity in any exchange that includes electronic coins in the
event that they are Blindly signed.
Two proposals for blind signature schemes have been published: the first, presented in, is
based on the RSA scheme and other based on Elgamaland Schnorr signature schemes[23].
Both the signatures can be used in digital cash but as they are the firs blind signatures they
lack in security features. Blind DSA signatures are quite a bit more complicated, but can
also be accomplished.
The blind signature has 4 phases they are:
1. Blinding Phase: In this phase the requester hides the message or blind the mes-
sage for the signer such that the signer can not be able to see the actual content of
the message and he did that by either multiplying the message with random number
or by encrypting it with some key or it can be hashed also.
2. Signing Phase: In this phase the signer signs the message by its own signature
but without revealing the actual content of the message. The signer signs blindly on
the message sent to him by the requester.
3. Unblinding Phase: In this step received message is unblinded by the requester.
4. Veryfying Phase:In this phase the verifier receives the signature and it verifies
the legitimacy of the signature by checking the verifying equations.
The following properties must be fullfilled by the blind signature scheme. They are
blindness, correctness, unlinkability, untraceability and unforgeability.
1. Correctness : Those who has the signer’s Public key will be able to check the
corectness of the blind signature scheme.
2. Blindness : Signer will not be able to see the contents of the message while
signing on it.
5
1.4 Certificaleless Blind Signature Introduction
3. Unforgeability : The signature should not be forged by some attacker and if
forged should be caught in the verification phase.
4. Untraceability: No one including the signer will be able to link between the
signature and the message signature pair.
Figure 1.3: Blind Signature
1.4 Certificaleless Blind Signature
After the proposal of blind signature scheme by Chaum’s, numerous blind signatures
schemes were proposed for diverse applications, these were based on TR-PKC, but in
TR-PKC fronts certificate management problem. In a TR-PKC, real trouble is the ar-
rangement and administration cryptographic keys. Therefore IDB-PKC is introduced,
that removed the certificate management problem but here the TTP used that creted the
key escrow problem. To handle both the problem that are related with traditional PKC and
ID based-PKC Certificateless-PKC is introduced. In Certificateless-PKC on the place of
TTP there is PKC private key generator having own secret key called master key. PKC
doesn’t has the information about user key. He know only user identity and on the basis of
that identity and system parameter with master key PPK is generated. user select a secret
key s, using this PPK and s the user private key is generated. Certificateless Blind Signa-
ture has combined features of certificatelss cryptography and blind signature. [28, 26]The
phase of certificateless blind signature are follows:-
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1. Set up phase: PKG runs the key setup algorithm. For this algorithm security
parameters are available. The algorithm takes security parameters as input and
output a master key and a parameter list param. param is declared public and keep
master private key private.
2. Partial private key generation phase:PKG taken public parameters using
user ID and master private key calculates partial private key.
3. User Secret key generation phase:User Key generation: Secret key genera-
tion phase: User secret key use for generating full private key of user. User chooses
his private key chosen from the set that are available in param.
4. User private key generation phase: User generates full private key us using
partial private key and - secret key of user.
5. User public key generation phase: User public key is generating at this
step using secret key of user and master public key. So here no direct relationship
between public key of user and private key of user. User can generate any key first
either public or private.
6. Signing: This phase complete in 3 steps: Blinding, Signing , Unblinding. In
blinding user blind the message using his own random number and blinding factor.
After blinding the message the user send the blinded message to signer.
After receiving the blinded message from user signer sign the message using his
own private key and random number, and then send this signed content to signer.
User receive the signed content now user unblind the message using random number
that user use in blinding phase.
7. Verifying phase: At this phase the verifier verify the signature validity whether
the signature is valid or not.
1.5 Applications of Certificaleless Blind Signature
1.5.1 E-Voting System
Blind signature broadly utilized as a part of e-voting. Voter is allowed to vote in favor
of anybody he/she make their vote, however the administrator doesn’t have any learning
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about their casting. In any case, administrator give the signature that everything happened
their is valid. He didn’t have power to think about who make the choice for whom. In gov-
ernment framework today’s this kind of e-voting plan is utilized, this application may be
made by any organization specialists, private affiliation, or any exceptional get-together of
people. The security of customer who make the vote is keeping outwardly impeded. Each
customer’s tossed vote can be adequately affirmed with the help of executive’s character.
In advanced mark confidentiality issue is a to a degree comprehended by blind signature.
1.5.2 Digital cash:
e-money was presented by David Chaum as a anonymous money framework. It is fasci-
nating to realize that e coins are blind signatures. e-money is a three gathering convention,
in which a client or the requester demands for cash withdrawal to his/her bank or the un-
derwriter for purchasing items from the trader. The underwriter checks the realness of
the requester and after that sends marked tokens to the requester. The requester sends
the tokens to the vendor and the trader give the token to the bank for confirmation of the
tokens. So we can see one exchange can issue one legitimate token bundle or one valid
signature. For various transaction the comparing signatures or the e-coins will be distinc-
tive. Anyway, these days numerous requester gets to be pernicious and spends the e-coins
for various times. This is known as the twofold spending issue. Despite the fact that blind
signature gives untraceability or unlinkability yet at times it is important to uncover the
personality of the requester. To do so,one requester ought not daze all the interior struc-
ture of the message. It ought to blind the external piece of the message so that by utilizing
the general public parameters the signer can ready to follow the identity of the malicious
requester. This is somewhat malicious is known as restrictive blind signature.
1.5.3 E-Business
The improvement of e-business accelerates on-line product dissemination, so protected
and proficient behavior of electronic installment has turn into a most serious issue which
needs to be unraveled critically. E-Business is a mix of ”email” and ”e-commerce”.Both
administration leads their functionality in the open system or over the free Internet, the
offering and a remarkable piece of the early stress about the security issues related to
them, can be solved with CLBS system.
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1.6 Motivation and Objective
Digital Signature plays an significant role in almost every field of information technology
for the purpose of authentication. In the technology advancement the concept of digital
signature is extended to Blind Signature. Several schemes was proposed that follows the
concept of Bilinear pairing, but either one of the proposed scheme has to compromise
with very high computational complexity, which is nearly impossible to implement in
today’s cyber world. The only purpose of our research work is to propose a scheme
which provides improved security features with the least computation overheads. So, we
proposed an algorithm which is based on DLP that uses the Certificate less concept.
1.7 Organization of Thesis
The rest of Thesis is organized as follow:
Chapter 2 : Chapter 3 : In this Chapter we discuss the mathematics of cryptog-
raphy. It describes the methods required to generate the prime numbers, the methods to
test the primality of a number,the cryptographic hash functions to generate the message
digest and the basic building blocks of discrete logarithm problem. At the very last of this
chapter we discuss about the security models for certificateless blind signature scheme.
Chapter 4:This chapter describes the proposed certificateless blind signature scheme
based on discrete logarithmic problem.
Chapter 5:In this chapter we perform the security analysis of our proposed scheme. We
showed that the proposed scheme fulfills all the properties like blindness and unlinkabil-
ity.
Chapter 6:Here we show that how the scheme is implemented in java language and
what are the results after implementation.
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Chapter 2
Literature Survey
We have gone through the paper Certificateless Public Key Cryptography the author Al-
Riyami and Paterson published in 2003[3]. In his work, he discussed about the details of
the Public Key cryptography and the problems related as well as in authentication such as
certification and complexity. They discussed the basic information about ID based cryp-
tography to overcome the certificate related problem in public key cryptography. They
have also discussed about the problems that are inherited with the Identity based public
key cryptography, and then they introduced the new type of cryptography called certifi-
cateless public key cryptography to overcome the problem that arised due to PKC and
Identity based PKC. They have divided this scheme into seven steps, these steps are key
setup, partial private key generation, user secret key generation user private key genera-
tion , user public key generation, encryption and decryption. This scheme’s security is
based on the Generalized Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (GBDHP), considering that
the GBDHP is hard.
We reviewed the paper On the Security of Certificateless Signature Scheme from
Asiacrypt by Xinyi Huang, Futai Zhang etc in the year 2003[18]. In this paper they
discussed about two types of attacks, they explained these attacks using game in which a
challenger and an attacker participate. Challenger provide some options for attacker, such
as attacker has the ability to change the public key or he can have the information about
master secret key. In TYPE 1 attack, the challenger first share all the public parameter
with attacker and the authority to change the public parameters. Attacker now can replace
the public parameter and challenger has to accept it as a real public key, and in TYPE 2
attack the challenger share the information of the master private key with attacker. In this
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paper they showed that the scheme proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson(2003) [3] is not
secure against TYPE 1 attack, but secure against TYPE 2 attack. In the same paper they
proposed the new type of certificateless Signature scheme that are secure against both
type of attack[18].
We have studied the paper Certificateless Signature Revisited presented by Xinyi
Huang, Duncan S. Wong, and Wei Wu[17], in which they again visited the security models
of certifcateless signature and introduced 2 new certificateless signature schemes. Their
proposed scheme is based on bilinear pairing. They partition the security attacks on the
basis of their attack capacity(normal, Strong and super type attacks). They proposed two
new ceriticateless signature schemes, the first one is secure against normal and strong
type attacks but not secured against super type attacks and the second signature scheme
is secure against all three types of attacks.
We have studied the paper Certificateless Signature and Blind Signature proposed
by Zhang Lei Zhang Futai[28]. They first present the certificateless signature scheme
showing some advantage on previous certificateless scheme, after that they proposed the
certificateless blind signature scheme. They are the first one, who introduced the blind
signature into certificateless public key cryptography. Both the scheme of this paper is
based on bilinear pairing, and the both schemes securities are based on Computational
Diffie-Hellman(CDH) problem. They discussed about the security attacks such as unfor-
gability and blindness and found secure.
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Chapter 3
Preliminaries
Here, we gave the details about the mathematical term, theorem and algorithms that are
used in our proposed scheme. We first give a short introduction about the integer fac-
torization and prime factorization, then we discuss the basics related to the primarily test
also the diffenrent algorithms that are used to check the primarily test. After that we gave
detail about discrete logarithmic problem and hash functions. In the end of this section,
we gave details of different security models related to certificateless signature and blind
signature[6].
3.1 Mathematical Background
3.1.1 Integer factorization and Prime Factorization
[14]A composite number is a positive whole number that has no less than one positive
divisor other than one or the number itself. As such, a composite number is any num-
ber more noteworthy than one that is not a prime number. Prime number is the number
that have no any other factor other than one and that number itself. Decomposition of a
composite number into smaller integer is called integer factorization. Prime factorization
of a number is the the factorization of any composite number into the products of prime
numbers. Prime factors of the any number can be calculated using following steps:
1. First we start from the first prime number 2, divide the number with that prime
number, goes to step 2.
12
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2. Continue till the number is divisible by that prime
3. If the last factor is prime then return else divide the factor with next prime number
and continue step 2.
3.1.2 Primality Tests
Prime number is very useful in cryptography, because every number other than 0 and 1 can
be expressed as the product of prime number. In many algorithm the prime factorization
technique is used because the prime factorization of a large number is taking much time.
The primality test is the type of test used to check the given number is prime or not. [14].
Many algorithms are available for this test. A naive algorithm or Square root test:
1. Take a positive integer number P that are grater than 2, and divide this P by the
odd numbers that are greater than or equal to 3 to the square root of P .
2. Giving a condition that if P is divisible by any of the number from 3 to square
root of P then the number P is composite. The most pessimistic scenario is that
we need to experience all odd number testing cases up to square root P . The
compexity of this algorithm is O(square root of N)
Fermat Test: There are two version of this algorithms are available [14]. In first
version for cheking a number is prime or not. Let us consider a number n, to check
whether n is prime check the equation an−1 = 1 mod n Here a is any integer. And
the second version of this theorem is to check n is prime then an = a mod n Here a
is any integer.
Miller-Rabin Test: This test having combined features of Fermat test and square root
test[14]. It is described using following step:-
Step 1: Take a number n. Finding the value of a and b such that n− 1 = a ∗ 2b.
step 2: Find the value of R such that ga mod n
step 3: Now if the value of R is equal to 1 or -1 then return thta the number n is prime.
Else the process enter into next step.
step 4: Now checking from 1 to b−1, calculating the value ofR asR = R2 mod n .
Checking the value ofR every time if value ofR is equal to 1 then result that the number
n is composite number and if value of R is equal to−1 then result that the number n is
prime number.
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3.2 Discrete Logarithmic Problem
Let us consider a given a group G having p number of element, g is the generator of this
group. Let us choose a number n from the group G, there exists a number x such that it
satisfy the following condition[15].
gx mod p = n (3.1)
. It is not always true that dlp is always hard. Its depends on the hardness of groups. DLP
is believed to be much harder than Integer factorization problem. This is why several
Encryption algorithms use DLP as their base like Elgammal and DSS. DLP holds the
similar relation to these systems as factorization does to the RSA: the security of these
frameworks depends on the presumption that discrete logarithms are hard to figure. DLP
when used for cryptographic purposes we usually chose Zn∗ as a group.
3.3 Cryptographic Hash Function:
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic function which maps a string of arbitrary
length to a string of fixed length called hashed value. This hashed message is called
message digest. Rov Rivest developed many hash algorithms[14] they are MD2, MD4 and
MD5. MD-2 takes 18 rounds to generated 128 bits message digest, but it is vulnerable to a
preimage attacks, so it is not considered to be secured. mD-4 takes 48 rounds to generates
128 bit message digest, but it found vulnerable against the collision attack published in
2007. mD-5 takes 64 rounds to generates 128 bit message digest, but it found vulnerable
against the collision attack published in 2013[22]. It is found that message digest size
128 bit is small to resist the collision. So National Institute of Standard and Technology
developed a new type of hash algorithms secure hash algorithm(SHA). In Which message
digest size is upto 512 bits. In our proposed SHA-2 algorithms is used. SHA-2 algorithms
having message digest size 256 bits.
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Chapter 4
Certificateless Blind Signature Based on
DLP
4.1 Description of the proposed scheme:
The proposed scheme has Seven phases for creating the signature and verifying it. These
are: setup ,partial private key generation, Secret key generation, User private key gener-
ation, User public key generation, signing phase, verifying phase. Here three parties are
involved in this signature generation scheme- PKG, user and signer.
PKG Key generation:
Set up phase: PKG chooses a very large prime number p. PKG calculate q a large
factor of p. After calculating q PKG find g the generator of group z∗q . PKG chooses a
random number ms ( ms ∈ z∗q ) and declares ms as a private key of PKG called master
private key. PKG also calculate master public keymp It is calculating using this equation
mp = g
m
s mod q
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Figure 4.1: Set up phase
Partial private key generation phase: PKG taken public parameters using
user ID and master private key calculates partial private key.ppk = (id+ms) mod q
Figure 4.2: Partial private key generation phase
User Key generation: Secret key generation phase: User secret key xA use
for generating full private key of user. User chooses his private key chosen from the set.
xAinz
∗
q
User private key generation phase User Generates full private key us using PPK
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and user secret key. It is calculating using equation s = (ppk ∗ xA)
User public key generation phase User Generates his public key up using master
public key and user secret key. It is calculating using equation up = m
xA
p
Figure 4.3: User public private key generation
Signing phase Signer chooses d as private key from the set of z∗q .(d ∈ z∗q ). Signer
computes his public key e for the use of verification phase, using the equation e = gd
mod q.
User send request to signer for sign the message. A random number k is chosen by signer
from set z∗q and v (e = g
k mod q)is calculated and sent to user. User selects 2 random
number a and b from set z∗q and calculates blinding factor f , as f = (a∗ b∗v)−1 User
blinded the message using blinding factor f . The blinded message is indicated usingm′.
user Chooses a random number l from the set z∗q and compute u = g
u.
m′ = f ∗H(m,us∗l−1) mod q (4.1)
Where, Function H(m,us∗l
−1
) calculated applying hashing algorithm (SHA-256) on
both the parameters H(m,us∗l
−1
) = SHA − 2(m) ∗ SHA − 2(us∗l−1) Now,
User sent m′ to signer.
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Figure 4.4: Blinding
Signer sign the message using his private key.
t′ = d ∗m′ mod q (4.2)
Signer sent the signed message to user. User unblinded the message using his random
number. t = a ∗ t′ ∗ b mod q
Finally user declared (t, e) as signature of signer. [ht]
Figure 4.5: Signing and Unblinding
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Figure 4.6: Verification phase
Verification phase: Anyone with the public parameters, user public key and signature
pair can verify the equation. If the following equation is true the signature verified else
note verified.
gt = eH(m,u
id
p ) mod q (4.3)
Where, Function H(m,us∗l
−1
) calculated applying hashing algorithm (SHA-256) on
both the parameters. H(m,uidp ) = SHA− 2(m) ∗H(uidp )
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Chapter 5
Security Analysis of Proposed
Algorithm
Correctness:
gt = eH(m,u
id
p ) mod q (5.1)
proof: Taking from left side
gt = ga∗t1∗b mod q
= ga∗d∗m1∗b mod q
= gd∗a∗m1∗b mod q
= ea∗f∗h1∗b mod q
= eh1 mod q
= eH(m,u
upri∗l−1) mod q
= eH(m,g
ls∗l−1
mod q
= eH(m,g
s) mod q
= eH(m,g
ppk∗xA) mod q
= eH(m,g
id∗ms∗xA) mod q
= eH(m,g
ms∗xA∗id) mod q
= eH(m,u
id
p ) mod q
(5.2)
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Theorem 1: The proposed CLBS scheme follows blindness properties.
Proof: The message blindness needs to be utilized along with some parameter v sent
by signer. After connected, the user who uses the random number a1 and b1 to generate
a blinding factor and combine it with an input message that are going through the hash
function and the whole operation is represented by the given equation.
m1′ = f ∗H(m1, uus∗l−1) mod q (5.3)
Where, f1 = (a1 ∗ b1 ∗ v)−1. The hash function we are utilizing as a part of our
proposed scheme is SHA-2, which is the safe message digest. So that, the attacker will
not be able to uncover anything about a genuinity of message, that is the reason we will
be able to prove that our scheme has fulfilled blindness property.
Theorem 2: The proposed CLBS scheme is follow unlinkabiliy prop-
erties.
Proof: Let us assume, two different messages M and N. The both message signed by
signer S individually. The proposed signature schemes are relied on upon DLP where we
have (M,t1,e1) and (N,t2,e2) message signature pair.
gt1 = ga1∗t1
′∗b1 mod q
= ga1∗d1∗m1∗v1∗b1 mod q
= ga1∗d1∗v1∗b1∗f1∗H(M,u
s1∗l1−1) mod q
(5.4)
gt2 = ga2∗t2
′∗b2 mod q
= ga2∗d2∗m2∗v2∗b2 mod q
= ga2∗d2∗v2∗b2∗f2∗H(N,u
s2∗l2−1) mod q
(5.5)
For the message M in blinding process random number a1 and b1 is used for blinding the
message. For the message N in blinding process random number a2 and b2 is used for
blinding the message, also hashed value of two different messages M and N is different.
For every new request to signer a different random value is generated so adversary cannot
21
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link the message signature pair.
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Chapter 6
Implementation and result
In our proposed scheme we have used Java platform for the implementation. There is no
need to use any database because we are not using any key storing in our proposed algo-
rithm. We have used NetBeans as integrated development environment for the purpose
of implementation. We are using BigInteger value for taking a large number operation
power, modpower, and random number generator. java security package is used for cryp-
tographic hash function and prime number generator. Signer signed the blinded message
and user unblinded the message. Now if the verification equation is true then the signature
is verified. We are using java util package for choosing a large prime number.In our pro-
posed scheme there are three parties private key generator, user and signer. In have taking
message input from file its size is 5KB. Blinding of message in our scheme is done using
cryptographic hash function. we are using SHA-2 our implementation. Our proposed
scheme consists of following seven phases in implementation:
1. Set up phase
2. Partial private key generation phase
3. Secret key generation phase
4. User private key generation phase
5. User public key generation phase
6. Signing phase
7. Verification phase
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Figure 6.1
The values for setup phases are given is bellow:
Generator g= 5421644057436475141609648488325705128047428394380474376834667300766108262613900542681289080713724597310673074119355136085795982097390670890367185141189796
Prime number p = 13232376895198612407547930718267435757728527029623408872245156039757713029036368719146452186041204237350521785240337048752071462798273003935646236777459223
Prime Factor q= 857393771208094202104259627990318636601332086981
Master Secret key= 821088938795765892514651341026343593096306647567
Master Public key= 656330862358746662641611542406751026530043748091
Enter user id, user id is=2162
partial private key= 821088938795765892514651341026343593096306649729
Secret key= 753975544261616070703514332737225396193479744901
private key= 457795997769403486154840678456303684538927016711
user public key= 279066139047540300741244826456526479774881723789
hashing process for message
Taking input from file
Hex format : 5a5032123d2b68966d42412ce620c341f38247a9d49e83705a70c28a8989a576
Hex format : d77d941588c15a9137bce9c4a9f8f371961b103491bb3ff413fa812b01e35561
hexcode to biginteger for use in program=
6091821272969986834553220846540242772851773445338486238664900371407530317153
elapsed time in hashcode generation of the message= 4.7ms Signing phase
signer public key= 54732997858202440286088558550866805973913743946
Unblinded content=725228640443498187188340260843964851477287066100
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Figure 6.2
Table 6.1: Analysis of Execution time in (ms)
Key Generation Hashing Signing Verification
599ms 4.7ms 79ms 0.18 ms
signature=725228640443498187188340260843964851477287066100
Signature length= 19 byte
verification phase
left side of verification
equation= 122272029218448325487300889743496703045345104251
Right side of verification equation= 122272029218448325487300889743496703045345104251
The Signature is verified.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented an efficient certificateless blind signature scheme. Their
security is based on the hardness of Discrete Logarithmic problem. Having all security
features with low computational overhead as well as feasible. In future our scheme can
be used to get a fair system policy in e-commerce. With the help of our scheme a more
secure E-cashing, E-voting, E-business can be build up in a great way. This proposed
algorithm can also be used for crime avoidance.
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